about possible use of gas since our last paper we have received no convincing evidence that Germany intends to initiate gas warfare, despite the Russian advances and the Anglo-American invasion of the Continent. The deterrent factors examined in paragraphs 4(a) to 4(d) in J.I.C.(43) 87 still apply and two of these carry more weight than before, i.e., Allied air superiority and likelihood that use of gas by Germany would accelerate the defection of her ill-equipped and ill-prepared satellites. It is possible also that the following two further considerations will now increasingly influence Germany against the use of gas; (i) it would prejudice any negotiations by which she might hope to secure some political advantage; (ii) in the event of a German defeat, a possibility now widely appreciated in Germany, it could only increase the Allied retribution that she fears There remains the possibility that Hitler, faced by imminent military disaster might order its use particularly (a) if he possessed a new gas (see paragraph 6 (a) below), and/or (b) if he believed that the Allies had relaxed their preparations for retaliation or defence.